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APOLOGY AND UTOPIA

In his Grotius Series Lecture, the legal theorist Nathaniel Berman

noted that the international legal order is plagued by two warring
tensions.' On the one hand, there is the tendency to look at the horrors
in places like Sudan or the Congo and say something must be done. We

cannot just allow aggression to go unchecked. Remember Rwanda. We
see intervention in Kosovo if not legal at least legitimate. There may be
dark sides to our virtue-human rights the language of aircraft carriers
not peace protesters-but even so, what is the point of our military
resources if we do not use them for good? Is that not, at least partly,
what we have them for? 2

* John D. Haskell, Visiting Researcher, Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP),
Harvard Law School; Co-founder of the Centre for the Study of Colonialism, Empire and
International Law (CCEIL); Ph.D. Candidate in Law, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London (SOAS); LL.M. (SOAS); J.D., University of California, Hastings College
of the Law (UC Hastings). I am deeply grateful to the encouragement and thoughts of first and
foremost, Akbar Rasulov, as well as Bill Bowring, Stephen Chan, Matthew Craven, Catriona
Drew, Peter Fitzpatrick, Paavo Kotiaho, Rob Knox, Boris Mamlyuk, Susan Marks, AnneCharlotte Martineau, Giuseppe Mastruzzo, Ugo Mattei, Scott Newton, Reut Paz, Evita Rackow,
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, Mai Taha, Owen Taylor, and the many insightful comments and
questions by the 2008-2009 undergraduate Law and Development class at SOAS. I also wish to
express my thanks to the Institute of Global Law and Policy (IGLP), the Centre for the Study of
Colonialism, Empire and International Law (CCEIL), and the International College University
of Turin (ICU). The views expressed in this Article are, of course, solely my own.
1. See Nathaniel Berman, In the Wake of Empire, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1515, 1554
(1999).
2. See David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 99 (2001); see also DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF
VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM

(2004).
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On the other hand, the professional policymakers and bureaucracies
of global governance remain, or have become skeptical, of things like
humanitarian intervention or normative projects for civil society.3 These
misgivings come from all sides of the aisle, ranging from arguments
concerning territorial sovereignty to accusations that, as in the case of
the former Soviet Union, humanitarians' best intentions often do more
harm than good for the people they are trying to help (e.&., eradicating
A liberal
their cultural traditions, destabilizing populations).
democratic model seems increasingly unable to meet the technological
and cultural transformations of the international community.
Indeed, things seem to have somehow gotten away from the
normative aspirations of the liberal humanitarianism of the post-Cold
War: the war on terrorism, the widening gap between rich and poor,
unresponsive and overreaching governments, as well as cultural
tensions both at home and abroad concerning issues of religion,
traditions, and politics.5 Polemics for democratic institutions harbor
deep cynicisms toward domestic administrations, the celebratory
declarations of progress and emancipation of the almost shrill
enunciation of hegemonic anxiety. Just as words like "civilization" and
"colonialism" became unpopular in the years following the World Wars
in Europe, many today have become skeptical toward the sincerity and
feasibility of a humanitarian rule of law and liberal democratic values. 6
The world feels more than ever outside of our own making. In the
3. There are at least two dimensions of this skepticism that should not be conflated.
First, a behavioral assumption that states by some intrinsic quality will abuse power, and should
therefore be kept outside the henhouse of international law proper. See, e.g., HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VERSUS POWER POLTICS 192 (1946). Second, a historicist
presumption that no matter how tightly woven, international rules of conduct will always be
subject to a double standard, what Ian Brownlie called "old fashioned hegemonic intervention."
See Ian Brownlie, The Principle of Non-Use of Force in Contemporary InternationalLaw, in
THE NON-USE OF FORCE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 26 (William E. Butler eds., 1989). However

practitioners and theorists attempt to purify international law of its vagaries (e.g., of its
"idealism" or "apology"), the outcome seems almost predestined to some cynical outlook about
the possibilities of law and governance, if not humanity.
4. See John Haskell & Boris Mamlyuk, Capitalism, Communism . .. and Colonialism?:
Revisiting Transitology as the Ideology ofInformal Empire, 9 GLOBAL JURIST art. 7 (2009).
5. See Jose Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration,
EUROZINE, July 27, 2004.
6. The classic modern description of this sentiment comes from the Nazi jurist, Carl
Schmitt who advanced the polemic that any rule of law was ultimately grounded on the maxim:
"Sovereign is he who decides the exception." See CARL SCHMrrT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (trans. George Schwab, 1988). While this line of

critique has often enjoyed currency within more conservative American "real-politic" advocates,
a variety of skeptical appraisals have also come from other corners, such as post-modernism and
Marxism. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 2; see also CHINA MIEVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL
RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); EVGENY PASHUKANIS,

THE

GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND MARXISM (1924).
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words of the American poet, Robinson Jeffers, modem man dances to a
"dreamled

. . . Disastrous

rhythm,"

somehow

both

intimate and

irreversible.
Within the liberal cosmopolitan sentiment today, it has become
almost a rite of authority to admit personal ambivalence or misgiving
toward the nature and momentum of not only our institutions, but our
very language and roles. Ambivalence reigns as practicing lawyers are
viewed as national diplomats, and academic discourse distrusted or seen
as simply unapproachable. Law and politics are flip sides of the same
coin, ideals serving the agendas of powerful political actors who cannot
be clearly identified. There is a general feeling that the international
community is poised at the edge of some emerging epoch, though
exactly what this may bring is up in the air. 9 We perceive ourselves in a
world without historical context-and yet, nevertheless, as the post
Cold War becomes the post 9/11 world, we wait for the next danger to
arise, whether it comes in the form of ecology, economics, or some new
military conflict.
It is within this moment without foundation or certainty that we
come searching for a post-foundational posture that might lead us
forward.10 This challenge is complicated because as the world becomes
increasingly interlinked, any set of normative values must somehow be
international in scope, sufficiently able to derive consensus, while also
meeting the particular needs and agendas of disparate social hierarchies
and cultures. On the one hand, abstract principles will lead, at best, to an
abstract consensus, and tends to ignore the historically contingent
character of values. On the other hand, to rigidly define liberty would

7.

See ROBINSON JEFFERS, REARMAMENT (1935).

8. Kae Matundu-Tjiparuro, an Ovambandero-Ovaherero activist and journalist,
expresses this distrust poignantly. In An Open Letter to Professor Hinz and Fellow
"Verkampte" Academics (on file with author), he writes, "It is time to speak to the pseudo good
intentions of some German siblings masquerading as academia. It's a suspicion I've been
harboring for some time. And suspicion is putting it very mildly." In particular, he is skeptical
of academics' "self-proclaimed liberalism, humanitarianism, and critical thinking." For
Matundu-Tjiparuro, these academics are "daily, and at a cruising speed, revealing their true
colors. At the end of the day, blood is thicker than water."
9. In reviewing the findings of their polling, for example, Balz and Brownstein observed
that "large numbers feel themselves uprooted by developments that they cannot understand or
control ... that they can no longer shape their own future." See MARTIN CASTELLS, THE POWER
OF IDENTITY 173 (2004).

10. The post-foundational tradition in political philosophy dates at least back to interwar
German philosophers and jurists, such as Heidegger and Schmitt, and has recently re-entered
international legal theory to various degrees through authors such as, David Kennedy, Martti
Koskenniemi, Anne Orford, and Tracy Strong. For a concise but useful overview of postfoundational thought, see OLIVER MARCHART, POST-FOUNDATIONAL

POLITICAL THlOUGHT:

POLITICAL DIFFERENCE IN NANCY, LEFORT, BADIou, AND LACLAU (2007).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5

288

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

ironically only result in liberty denied." In the current economic crisis
that has descended around the globe, these challenges feel all the more
radically present, demanding some new way forward.
In this Article, I have adopted a two-fold approach to these
challenges. First, I want to briefly think about some common "illusions"
that may restrict our ability to cope with the violence and paranoia that
haunts our horizons. My suspicion is that too often we see ourselves in
the role of architects, embroiled in debates over the structural aspects of
civil society at home and global governance abroad. In this sense, I
want to suggest that it is not our institutions or ideological
underpinnings that stifle our efforts, but something more intimate,
something about our most cherished conceptions of our past, those
illusions about our own personality and the projects we sign up to. This
might be seen as the search less for a set of concrete virtues, and more
for a posture or sensibility to guide us forward. Second, I want to turn
and think about how this sensibility might be applied in practice, and
specifically to think about this in relation to the looming financial crisis.
My hope in this work is not to provide an in-depth analysis of any of the
current challenges that face global law and policy, but to focus on the
sensibility that experts more often than not bring to the table, and to
inject into this ongoing conversation some more recent advances within
Continental European Rhilosophyl 2 and critical theories of international
law and development. The task here, in other words, is to propose an
initial step into thinking how we might move more boldly beyond the
politics of knowledge, of self-reflection and ambivalence, to a politics
of truth-what we might see as an experience of the freedom, or
perhaps the thrill, of taking risks ethically.

11. See ROBERT SHEA & ROBERT ANTON WILSON, THE ILLUMINATUS TRILOGY 452-54
(1975) (stating and expanding on the line, "[fjreedom defined is freedom denied"). The problem
here is at least two-fold. First, as authors as early as G.W.F. Hegel observed, legal rules only
correspond to particular "definite circumstances," and if these circumstances are removed, the
legal rules themselves are no longer necessarily beneficial. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, § 3R (English trans. S.W. Dyde, 1896). Second, as Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the subsequent American legal realists observed, rules are
themselves always open to interpretation, rendering debates over "hard" and "soft" standards
largely unhelpful. For useful introductions to this tradition, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); see also THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

(William W. Fisher III & David Kennedy eds., 2006).
12. In particular, I am thinking about the political philosophy of authors such as Alain
Badiou in response to "radical democracy" theories within French intellectual circles.
13. See, e.g., THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITlcAL APPRAISAL
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT].

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss2/5
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H. A GENTLE CIVLIZING SPIRT?
Practitioners and theorists within the field of global governance tend
to share the sentiment that our professional traditions and liberal
humanitarian rigor stand against the violence of empire, and that we are
the natural or deserving descendents of those great dead white men of
the Enlightenment who first began to dispel the superstitions and
irrationalities of our past with reason and genuine, if at times flawed,
good will.14 As John Gray, the British economist and philosopher at
LSE, states: "we are all modernizers today."' 5 History may be uncertain,
but we all approach it with our technocratic toolboxes, informed by
scientific fact and weathered experience. If anything, while we may be
suspicious about some of our colleagues' abilities or views, we count
ourselves among that number emancipated from the past and committed
to a better tomorrow.
This attitude though ignores that colonial empires have always been
controlled by a technology of knowledge, rulership dressed up,
consciously or unconsciously, in philanthropic and "lawful" motives to
further understanding and order. As the legal theorist Scott Newton
points out, we need look no further than the British Museum to see that
part of the imperial project was to collect objects from around the world
and classify them. I do not imagine that the colonial experts then saw
themselves as bad people or acted on bad intentions any more than we

understand our roles today. They also held conferences to share their
experiences in far off lands about methods of good governance. The
Berlin Conference of 1885 dividing Africa into a series of straight lines
and right angles was done in the name of the moral and material well
being of the African people-carried out by humanitarians, priests,
government officers and soldiers. They too were concerned with
humanity and armed with the cutting-edge tricks of the day.
In this sense, to some degree the various opinions and debates
currently at play are more likely rhetoric and polemics, an intellectual
excursion or opportunity for professional networking and entertainment
than they actually provide any hope of something new. To draw from
Edward Said, we may be merely telling ourselves as every nation does
that "[our] mission is not to plunder and control, but to educate and

14. For perhaps the most eloquent and sophisticated argument within this tradition, see
the eminent philosopher and historian of international law, MARrT KOsKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
ClILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001) (it should

be noted, however, that Koskenniemi is no simple "apologist," and his work has been both at the
forefront of more critical appraisals of legal and political practice over the last couple decades
and an inspirational point of reference for progressive scholarship).
15. See JOHN GRAY, STRAW DoGs 173 (2003).
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liberate."1 6 Behind our clever arguments and compassionate
sensibilities, in short, lies the fact that perhaps things have not changed
except for the technology of our warfare-how the impulse is organized
and its targets defined. If this is so, the question falls upon us, how can
we address such concerns without slipping into self-induced, postmodern atrophy?
For many within the United States, often identifying themselves as
progressive or liberal, inspiration may be found in a more fraternal
universalism-what is in fact a federalist, and predominantly European,
conception of social organization. Nation-states here are obliged to
defer domestic legislative authority to ratified international agreements,
the generalized interests of "civilized" nations trumping particular
political interests, especially when they violate some long-standing,
recognized norm of law governing state behavior. Appeals to a
universal legal order, however, does nothing to settle suspicions that
these appeals actually reflect the agendas of powerful political actorslegal instruments advancing particular actors the same way a papal
decree served the Holy Roman Catholic Church. Institutions (such as
democracy or human rights) do not end politics, they merely enact
them. Powerful nation-states have typically upheld their sovereign will
above the reach of any international judiciary that would claim
universal or permanent jurisdiction. In practice, the majority of states
share at best an uneasy allegiance, more in spirit and diplomatic rhetoric
than a sincere appreciation of common interests. One might indeed
question how international law may promote national self-determination
projects as the authentic expression of a people, and at the same
moment submit the emerging sovereignty to a rigid set of expectations
and responsibilities completely foreign to it.
In a world increasingly brought together by technological innovation
and invisible forces of capital, it seems inevitable that we look to a
future of escalating conflict over resources. Blood is thicker than water;
the contingencies of the moment triumph over idealism. The future will
be marked by more, not less conflict and catastrophe. It is foolish to
dream otherwise. To this extent, the tendency to blame American
diplomacy or to seek inspiration from Europe or the U.N. framework of
process, sanctions and rights seem misguided at best. However,
policymakers might be equally cautious of looking back to our own
government bureaucracies and national traditions for a more authentic
or sincere answer to governance. The litany of reoccurring political
scheming and scandals (i.e., Iran Contra affair, officially sanctioned
torture, the lobby interests involved in the ongoing health care debate,
16. See Edward Said, Imperial Perspectives, available at http://www.zmag.org/content/
showarticle.cfm?SectionlD=22&ItemID-3949 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
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and so on) have produced a visible attitude within the American
mainstream that anything our government leaders say, Democrat or
Republican, must be taken with a pound of salt. The good life has
become a semantic battle of pundits, government officials and scholars,
while Americans uncomfortably confront a future of economic hardship
and greater surveillance by a government where public opinion only
counts as far as it can be charted and manipulated for political profit and
politicians limit their commitments to talking points and carefully
staged photo ops.17
Intellectual criteria today require a certain internationalist
perspective in politics, just as it requires a multidisciplinary approach in
academia. In reality, however, the international community remains
both physically and metaphorically set in its own backyard. We speak
of the Rwandan genocide in Borders Book Store over Starbucks fair
trade coffee. We plan humanitarian projects for places where we do not
speak the language and have never been ourselves. We may speak for
the dispossessed, but it is we speaking-heroic protagonists in a world
drama. We travel on large commercial aircrafts to speak at conferences
concerning environmental woes. We claim allegiance with the
American working class (e.g., 'main street') while we wear clothes from
overseas sweatshops.
In the international legal community, we have taken words like
human rights and the rule of law to stand in as the answers and
rationalizations for our future projects. Indeed, if the nineteenth century
was the era of nations, we live today in an era of law. The drive for
progress through a world ruled by law has become an unimpeachable
fact in the existence of humankind's struggle against chaos as Western
scholars and practitioners carry on the colonial mentality-the white
man's academic burden to write histories not his own, to perform
humanitarian experiments in strange lands, to continually act as chief
architect of humanity, justifying global rulership upon hazy
acknowledgments of responsibility or technocratic knowledge and skill.
It may then be time that we come to terms with the fact that progress
itself is, in the words of Karl Kraus, merely a "pyrrhic victory over
nature"-our best laid plans meet the "sudden surprises ... and decay"
inherent to our human frailty. A more celebratory attitude only marks
the bravery of being momentarily out of range. We should not put too
much faith in finding solutions in a professional attitude of enlightened
self-interest any more than we can hope to nurture some sort of "gentle
civilizing spirit." As part of the cultural elite with cosmopolitan
backgrounds, we may have to put aside our architectural inclinations
17. See generally DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (2006) (discussing the modem
limitations of political responsibility and the inadequacies of "shaming" political actors).
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and grand ideological differences, and begin to look at our every-day
lives and how our experiences are so far removed from the realities that
we speak about in our writing, in the classroom, at conferences, or even
in conversation. If Gandhi is right that change in the world must start
with oneself then the commitment to help Africa or Iraq, for instance,
must begin with a rigorous examination of our own habits and customs
rather than continually look for inspiration in refashioning the world
over our borders.' 8 We must begin to historicize our assumptions in
order to denaturalize those judgments that keep us tied to pre-written
scripts;19 to explore the limits of our own responsibility, of our ability to
take responsibility, and not venture further than where we are actually
willing to remain after the cards have been played.

III. THE END OF AMBIVALENCE?
Here, I want to turn to think about how these notions of ethical
responsibility might meet the challenge and propose concrete virtues to
the ongoing global economic crisis. For in the wake of the financial
meltdown, where we only recently would speak of uncertainty and
approach even the most virtuous projects with ambivalence, action now
seems the name of the game. Everything is immanent, only bold
proposals are open to consideration. In philosophical terms, we speak
within the wake of what Alain Badiou called the "incalculable event,"
that moment that compels some sort of tenacious militant
determinism.20 Or as the Austrian and Chicago economists put it more
18. See B.S. Chimni, Alternative Visions of Just World Order: Six Tales from India, 46
HARV. INT'L L.J. 389-402 (2005); see also SLAVOJ ZIZEK, IN DEFENSE OF LOST CAUSES 161
(2009) (noting that the source of Robespierre's "pacificism" does not reside in any
"humanitarian sensitivity," but rather, in the understanding that war between nations serves as
"the means to obfuscate revolutionary struggle within each nation"). While Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars provocatively demonstrated that
international legal doctrines were often formed in the antagonisms between Europe and nonEuropean cultures (as opposed to the historical development of ideas by leading jurists), recent
scholarship within this tradition has begun to focus on the role that domestic and inter-European
rivalries (e.g., cultural, religious, economic, and so on) played in shaping the discipline. For
some of the most engaging TWAIL literature, see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); see also James Thuo Gathii,

InternationalLaw and Eurocentricity, 9 EURO. J. INT'L L. 184 (1998) (book review); James
Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261
(2002); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL

MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
19. See generally HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY

(1973).
20. This theme runs through Alain Badiou's work. See ALAIN BADIoU, THEORY OF THE
SUBJECT (Bruno Bosteels trans., Continuum 2009); ALAIN BADIOU, ST. PAUL: THE FOUNDATION
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crassly, "only a crisis, actual or perceived, produces real change." 2 1 in
my own country, even President Bush appeared to be marching to the
same tune. "I'm a market oriented guy," he said at a speech from
November 2008, "but not when I'm faced with the prospect of a global
meltdown." 22
Of course, what caused the financial crisis or our vision and goals of
engagement are up for fierce debate. Is the crisis just one of those things
that happen in cyclical fashion-an almost natural event, an economic
hurricane, something that can only be engaged with at the last minute,
weathered out and dealt with largely after the fact? Or was it due to
those mysterious formulas and investment instruments concocted by
those nerdy economists from Chicago that came to dominance in the
70s/80s?23 Likewise, even if the blame ultimately resides with the
simple corruption and greed of Wall Street and a coked up capitalist
ideology, how do we move forward? 24 At the end of the day, after all
our proposals and criticisms are out of the way, De Soto observes that in
one form or another "capitalism [still] stands alone as the only feasible
way rationally to organize a modem economy," at least in the
immediate term. 2 5
OF UNIVERSALISM (Ray Brassier trans., Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University 2003) [hereinafter ST. PAUL]; ALA.I4 BADIou, ETmics: AN ESSAY ON THE
UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL (Peter Hallward trans., Verso 2001) (1998). For Badiou, Paul's

conversion to Christianity on the road to Damascus is a clear example of this militancy. "Just as
the Resurrection remains totally incalculable .

.

. nothing leads up to .

.

. Paul's faith... The

event-'it happened,' purely and simply, in the anonymity of a road-is the subjective sign of
the event proper that is the Resurrection of Christ." In Badiou's thinking, the truth, coming as an
act of grace, transcending particularity and subjectivity, is ultimately the only stable source of
"effective declaration," for the "possible power of thought." See ST. PAUL, supra,at 17, 88-89.
21.

See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ROSE D.

FRIEDMAN,

CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (40th Anniversary ed. 1962).

22. The U.S. White House claims that its actions are "unprecedented," "aggressive," and
"extraordinary." See U.S. President George W. Bush, Financial Markets and World Economy 3
(Nov. 13, 2008) (transcript available at www.us-global-trade.com/Article.Bush.Global%20
Financial%20Summit%20(l1.13.08).doc).
23. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 73-

94 (2002).
24. The recent letter from the President of the United Steelworkers, Leo Gerard, to U.S.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson criticizes the "unbridled pursuit of greed that you and your
friends on Wall Street have celebrated as a national religion," but continues on to call for a reinvestment in "the American dream"-itself perhaps, in many ways, part and parcel of the very
same problems that have buffered the "philosophy that worships only business, free markets,
deregulation and free trade." For a copy of the letter in the context of neocolonial "plunder," see
Ugo Mattei, PlunderBlog! Mr. PaulsonPlunders Taxpayersfor the Sake of His Own Firm. . . ,
Red Room blog, available at http://www.redroom.com/blog/ugo-mattei/plunder-blog-mrpaulson-plunders-taxpayers-sake-his-own-firm.
25.

See HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
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But maybe this is wrong. Perhaps this is exactly the problem, that we
have forgotten the exhilaration of thinking outside the box, to regain
what it would mean to be caught up in the throes of some "new militant
apparatus of truth." 26 After all, nothing is absolute; everything is
ultimately contingent.2 7 Who could have predicted the rise of the
Internet or the fall of the Soviet Union fifty years ago? We find causes
after the effects, but even effects more often than not come to us as
black swans. 28 There is no reason that the current capitalist order is any
more inescapable-it merely reflects the lack of our will to power and
imagination.
Whatever the case, the New American Century appears to already
have run out of steam. The specter of univocal global order feels
increasingly remote. The war in Iraq continues to drain American will
and resources; the American military woefully underprepared for urban
combat warfare and long-term occupation and reconstruction efforts.
The U.S. share of global imports is down to fifteen percent, its currency
weakened without any foreseeable reversals, all while alternative stock
exchanges and sovereign wealth funds transfer capital to new centers of
national power. With the demise of American hegemony and contagious
financial instability have simultaneously spread, predictions that the
free-market economy itself, whatever that means, teeters on the verge of
collapse.3 0 If the neo-conservative agenda has proven itself
ideologically and practically bankrupt, the hope seems to be that some
more equitable order can fill the gap-whether that is expressed in some
call for a more democratic balance of powers among nations, or
alternatively for the nation-state as a more active stakeholder and
regulatory agent in the market. In my mind, both programs are
misguided if our goal is to achieve a more progressive, realizable future.
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).

26. This phrase comes from Alain Badiou. For an analysis of this idea, see PETER
HALLWARD & SLAVOJ ZIZEK, BADIou 108-10 (2003). Of course, as Zizek has pointed out, there
seems to be an irresolvable tension that often rises between meaningful action and taking
responsibility. While we may abstractly favor the right of political agents to posit themselves
outside the conventional social edifice, we might be "afraid of the potential 'totalitarian'
terrorist consequences of asserting 'actual freedom' as the direct inscription of the Event into
the order ofBeing." See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, ON BELIEF 124-25 (2001) (emphasis added).
27. For a philosophical polemic of this idea, see QUENTIN MEILLASSOUX, AFTER
FINITUDE: AN ESSAY ON THE NECESSITY OF CONTINGENCY (2008); see also NASSIM NICHOLAS
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007).
28. See TALEB, supra note 27.

29. The Project for the new American Century is a neoconservation project promoting
American world leadership that was founded in 1997 by Robert Kagan and William Kristol. See
Welcome to the Project for the New American Century, http://www.newamericancentury.org
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
30.

See generally GIOvANNI ARRIGHI, ADAM SMITH IN BEIJING: LINEAGES OF THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007).
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All roads no longer lead to Washington, but they do not alternatively
lead to any necessarily stable sharing of influence among great powers.
Not only does the fate of the global order seem to rely increasingly on
those next tier of tipping point states but with the diffusion of power
now among dozens of actors: media conglomerates, drug cartels,
militia, global corporations, regional organizations, and so on. In the
world to come, diplomacy and collective action will most likely become
more, not less, tricky and precarious. Moreover, unlike the Soviet Union
that posed an ideological/political alternative for decolonized states, the
ascending national powers today seem all too eager to leverage their
positions in the existing economic regime. Indeed, it may be that what
Western capitalism could not achieve through economic, political, or
cultural coercion, it may succeed through importing crisis. Chaos brings
its own temptations and opportunities as nations scramble to shore up
their declining sovereignty through massive government commitment to
the global economic order. If anything, we may very well be moving
from a North-South to an East-West axel-ity reminiscent of the late
nineteenth century colonial experience-nations like Russia and China
and the United States and within Western European states
simultaneously competing with one another for territory and resources
while disavowing any responsibility to act as a buffer for the social
costs to their national populations.
What we are experiencing in the West, then, is a more immanent,
internalized return of colonialism: the development and law policies
carried out in Latin America in the 70s and in Central and Eastern
Europe in the late 80s and early 90s now visited in full force upon North
Atlantic populations. As journalist and freelance author, Naomi Klein,
points out, "Under cover of an emergency.. . the [U.S.] administration's
approach to the financial crisis and its approach the Iraq war . .. [bear

moving] parallels," the state hollowed out as a cash source for
corporations that in turn do not deliver the goods and end up ratcheting
the burden upon an increasingly paralyzed citizenry. ' For Klein, it is
not the banks and corporations being nationalized, but the nation-state
being privatized one emergency, or shock, at a time.32
In this light, the call for stricter legal regulation to fix the inherited
chaos of economic over-speculation and political corruption appears
doomed to failure. Capitalism is, after all, made of nothing but law-it
is juridical, the very stuff of commercial markets. 33 "Far from a space of
31. See Naomi Klein, The New Trough, ROLLING STONE MAG. ONLINE, Nov. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/24012700/thenew-trough, (last visited
Dec. 20, 2009).
32. Id.
33. This is a reoccurring theme within Newstream literature and related traditions. See
generally KENNEDY, supra note 17; see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA:
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'utter lawlessness,"' the free market crisis we have inherited is "a space
filled to the brim with expertise, procedure, scrutiny and analysis." 34
Likewise, we should not imagine that any mere nationalization scheme
is somehow anathema to capitalism; the social state is as old as
industrial capitalism. Here, to treat any set of regulatory law in and of
itself as some sort of redemptive force if only properly responsible and
enforced obscures not only the fact that these very norms may have
contributed to creating and sustaining the problems, but also empty the
situation of its "scandalous political content."35 Heated discussions how
the agendas of particular subcultures and agents prime and manipulate
the system become whitewashed into civilized conversations about the
structure and limits of fair and efficient administration-what turns into
"politics without politics."
The reliance upon ever more dramatic techniques by the corporatist
crusade to remake the world in the image of homo economicus does not
necessarily mean it has won the day-we could as easily be witnessing
a system unraveling by its own schemes. Or alternatively, perhaps this
is just capitalism going through growing pains, reinventing and
disciplining itself as new actors force their way into the game.36 Perhaps
we just too easily forget the emotions of crisis, and imagine each time
around some apocalyptic scenario, some hope that we have suffered
toward something monumental, of long-lasting significance-as
President Barack Obama's worldwide appeal demonstrates, populations
want to believe in change.
But if everything is contingent, there is always room for strategy and
reversals of fortune. In my mind, however, this can only happen if we
move from a strictly critical to a more programmatic attitude that looks
THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005); CHINA MIEVILLE, BETWEEN
EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); THE NEW LAW AND

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13.

34. I have drawn this idea and the general language from Fleur Johns' article. Fleur
Johns, Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 613, 618
(2005) (Italy).
35. I have drawn this general idea and language from Susan Marks, State-Centrism,
InternationalLaw, and the Anxieties ofInfluence, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. (2006) (Neth.). See also
BILL BOWRING, THE DEGRADATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: THE REHABILITATION
OF LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICS 126 (2008).

36.
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with
their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away,
all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is
solid melts into air.
See KARI MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 223 (2002).
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beyond law or the nation-state or any romantic notions of an
international collective responsibility. While we may find fatherly
comfort in law and regulation, it ultimately "entail[s] inevitable
ideological and distributional choices . .. [that can] only be resolved by

resort to values and policies which are external to the law."3 7 We must
come to accept that law does not provide "closure to ideological
disputes and political conflicts" but merely enacts and naturalizes
them.38 Law always leads us elsewhere, to somewhere outside its own
reference points and logic. Moreover, the debate over the extent of state
"intrusion" into the market is misguided, a myth of liberalism. "Private
economic power operates necessarily through and with the exercise of
public power."39 What might be more interesting to ask ourselves, is
what exactly do we want the state doing. If we are truly experiencing
development strategies now being played out upon Western
populations, for instance, perhaps we should look to previous moments
of resistance and alternative visions of order and growth toward
political economy. Likewise, while there has been no shortage of
rejections of global inequality, there has been little hard institutional
thinking putting forward meaningful alternative projects. How could we
escape industrial-led growth and everything that seems to come with it,
even if we wanted to?
IV. CONCLUSION: TAKING RISKS ETHICALLY

Too often our passion for justice in the past has taken on an
40
international character, resigned to some abstract universalism. We
condemn coercion on the global sphere while tolerating it within our
national boundaries, always choosing battles that we have the privilege
to disengage from at any time if the stakes get too high. The crisis,
however, has brought home the uncomfortable fact that colonialism and
violence occur in a more broad and intimate field of inquiry than we
often assume-within the landscape of London and Los Angeles as
much as Namibia and Sierra Leone. In this light, as George Kennan said
many years ago, perhaps "the first thing we [Americans] need to learn
to contain is, in some ways, ourselves.

. .

. [and] that a large proportion

37. See KERRY RrnTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND
GENDER INMARKET REFORM 133 (2002); see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE STAKES OF LAW, OR
HALE AND FOUCAULT!, 15 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 327 (1991).

38. RiTTICH, supra note 37, at 135.
39. Id.
40. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 17.
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of the sources of our troubles and dangers lie .

.

[Vol. 22

. within ourselves."A]

Revolutions big and small happen with people like Luther and Lenin,
not Derrida and Foucault. 42 In short, we must take risks and put our own
houses in order. If this means that we check our wishes, that we cannot
escape the limits and boredom of our everyday world, then perhaps that
is the price. But if so, it might also allow for a full wager, some politics
of truth, which could function as the very opening to the concrete
realization of the impossible.

41.

See George Kennan, Containment: 40 Years Later: Containment Then and Now, 65

FOREIGN AFF. 885, 889-90 (1987).
42. The general language is derived from a conference presentation by Akbar Rasulov,
Bringing Class Back into InternationalLaw: A Response to Prof Chimni, presented at Critical
Legal Studies Conference, Univ. of Glasgow (Sept. 6,2008).
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